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SUMMARY:

Law, G~and Central Terminal and its site have been designated

~':r "landmark" and a
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Under New York City's Landmarks Preservation

law
I

"landmark site,'' respe ctively.

Pursuant to this

appellants were prevented from undertaking certain construction
'

inv'olving the Terminal.

Appellants contend that, in violation of the

_Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, they have been denied just
compensation for the property right deprivation imposed·1 by this
restriction.
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2. FACTS:

In 1967, over the objection of Penn Central,

the Landmarks Presevation Commission of the City of New York
designated the Terminal and its site as a "landmark" and a "landmark
site."

Under the City's LandmarkS Law, no construction on the

site and no alteration of the exterior appearance of the Terminal
are permitted without prior approval by the
Landmarks Commission.

Specifically, before proceeding with

construction, a landmark owner must seek a "certificate of no
exterior effect" or, if there will be exterior effect, a permit for
minor work or a "certificate of appropriateness."
Related to the Landmarks Law are certain amendments

C

"-...•·

to the New York City Zoning Resolution, which permit the transfer
of unused development rights over landmark properties located in
certain high density areas of the City to other nearby sites.

- ~------------------

Transferable development rights [TDR's] permit a landmark owner
to convey to a limited number of nearby properties the right to

?

develop those properties.
\

The transferee owners are then permitted

1

to build on their properties in a manner that exceeds the otherwise
applicable zoning regulations.
In order to reduce its operating losses on the Terminal,
Penn Centr~l entered, in 1968, a lease with appellant UGP
Properties, Inc., under which UGP was to construct an office building
on the Terminal site and pay Penn Central substantial rent for this
privilege.
After a design for the office building was
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completed, Penn Centra. submitted the design--in compliance
with the Landmarks Law--to the Landmarks Commission and applied for
a "certificate of no exterior effect," the granting of which
would have permitted the office building to have been
constructed.

This application was denied in September, 1968.

Penn Central then applied for "certificates of appropria·teness,"
submitting the original plan and two revisions as alternatives.
The last of these applications was denied on August 20, 1969.
In October 1969, appellants initiated this action.
They sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that the actions
of the Landmarks Connnission constituted a taking of private
property for Rublic use without just compensation in violation of
1
due process :and equal protection.
The Trial Term of the New
York Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Landmarks Law, as applied,
constituted an unconstitutional taking.

.The Supreme Court did

not attribute any value to the TDR's.
The City of New York appealed.

The Supreme Court's Appellate

Division reversed the trial court, upholding the constitutionality
of the Landmarks Law as applied and finding that there had been
no compensable taking. Two of the five justices dissented, essentially
adopting the rationale of the trial court.
1

Penn Central also sought compensation for the alleged temporary
taking of the property for the period between its designation as a
landmark and the judicial invalidation of such a designation. This
claim was severed by the Trial Term of the New York Supreme Court and
judgment reserved.
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The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the
decision of the Appellate Division. The Court stated that there
was "no constitutional imperative" that a property owner's
economic return "embrace all attributes, incidental influences, or
contributing external factors derived from the social complex in
2

which the property rests." A. 2. In so holding, the Court sought
to distinguish the "ingredient of property value" created by "the
efforts of the property owner" from the "ingredient" created ,rby
the accumulated indirect social and direct government investment
in the physical property, its functions, and its surroundings."
A.

(

1-2, 9.

According to the Court, "[i]t is enough for the limited

purposes of a landmarking statute . . . that the privately created
ingredient of property receive a reasonable return.'' A.2-3.

?

Considering only this "privately created ingredient," the Court
held that Penn Central had failed to prove that it was impossible toe ~

7

--

a "reasonable return" on ~

its properties benefited

y the

Terminal's operations, even if the Terminal itself "can never operate
at a profit." A. 9.
The Court also held that the unused development rights over
the terminal could be transferred to a number of other properties
owned by Penn Central.
(

While conceding the "many defects" of the

2

However, the Court also made clear that, in its view, "[t]his is
not a zoning case." A. 4.

-----------
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TDR's

and acknowledging that such rights "may not be equivalen t

in value" to the development rights taken from Penn Central, the
Court concluded that the TDR's "are valuable" and provide "significant :
perhaps 'fair', compensation for the loss of rights above the Terminal
itself." A. 13-14.
3. CONTENTIONS:

Appellants contend that the N.Y. Ct. App. 's

decision contains several related and erroneous propositions
of law.

Most fundamentally, appellants argue tht the Court

erred in implying that the desirability of preserving historical
landmarks through government
regulation derogates from the
,__ ___ __,_
constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid for the
public taking of private property. In particular they contend
the
that/ finding that Penn Central has failed to establish
that there is no possibility, without exercising its development
rights, of earning a reasonable return on all of its
remmining properties that benefit in any way from the operations of
the Grand Central Terminal should not have warranted the conclusion
that no compensation need be paid for the taking of those rights.
Also, appellants allege that the Court erred in holding that
they are entitled to no compensation for that large but unmeasurable
portion of the value of its rights to construct an office building over
the Terminal that is said to stem from the efforts of "society

1

a~ an organized entity" rather than from the efforts of any private
party.

Lastly, appellants contend that the possibility accorded to

Penn Central of realizing some value by transferring the Terminal's

- 6 -

TDR's to other buildings--under a procedure that is acknowledged
to have many weaknesses--does not meet the
constitutional requirements of just compensation.
Appellees simply assert that the constitutional issues which
appellants seek to raise are insubstantial.

Appellees contend

that where--as they allege to be the case here--a municipal
~uilding ~

la s~on is challenged on economic grounds but it is

not established that the regulation precludes a reasonable return
on the value of the building, the owner of the property has not been
denied due process.

4. DISCUSSION:

A number of state statutes and municipal and

county ordinances have recently been enacted to preserve historically
or aesthetically important landmarks.

See Juris. Statement, 9 n. 9.The

pi::'ope.il'.! a;,pr::- ,..:ch co landr!lari.-t preservation has become one of the
most:discussed issues in ~ecent legal literature.

See, e.g.,

✓Note, "The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights,"
84 Yale L.J. 1101 (1975).
As the N.Y.Ct. App. recognized, however, there are very few
precedents on the subject.

Accordingly the decision below is--on

important points-all but bereft of supportive authority.
Especially troublesome are the specific issues emphasized by appellants.
Most si.1?:nif:i.c;antljT',. aJi.though the N.Y.Ct. App's decision is

-

not entirely clear, it does appear to except 1 landmaiks laws
~

from traditional just compensation analysis and create a new
constitutional category "for the limited purposes of a landmarking
~

------- -----------

•
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statute." A. 2-3.
pursuant to

The decision evidently holds that a taking

New York City's Landmark Law is unobjectionable if

the property in question can still provide a "reasonable return"
for its owner.

In other cases where property rights are taken,

compensation has been required whether or not any remaining
property interest can still earn a "reasonable return."
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1972).
Closely related to the "reasonable return" aspect of the
decision below is the N.Y. Ct. App. 's effort to limit

I • ••

compensation to that portion of value created solely by "private"
efforts.

(

As noted supra, the Court asserted that "there is no

constitutional imperative that the return [to a property owner]
embrace all attributes, incidental influences, or contributing exter n
factors derived from the social complex in which property rests."
A. 2.

This view seems at odds with this Court's definition of proper

as "the group of rights inherir:1g

in the citizen's relation to the

physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of i t .
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of tnterest
the citi zen may possess." United States v . Genera l Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
The N.Y. Ct. App. 's discussion of Penn Central's TDR's is also
open to question.

The Court acknowledged that the area in which

,

transfers are permitted is "severely limited," and that "comple~.
procedures are required to obtain a transfer permit." A. 13.
More basically, the Court concedes that the TDR's "may not be the
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equivalent in value to development rights on the original
site." A. 12. However, the Court appeared to conclude
that these TDR's may discharge the constitutional requirement
of compensation for the taking of the Terminal's development
rights. A. 13-14.

iven if this was the tourt's conclusion,

the rest of the opinion provides ample reason to doubt
whether the TDR's provide "a full and perfect equivalent
for the property taken," Monongahela Naviagion Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).

See also Regional Rail Reorganization Act

Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 150-151 (1974).
5. RECO!vlMENDATION:

As noted supra, the issues raise~ in this

case have thus far received little attention in the lower courts,
., ·_ though the number of landmark laws now in effect suggest that they
will soon be receiving considerable attention.

If this case were

here on cert, the paucity of relevant precedents would be one
I

factor militating strongly in favor of a deaial.

However, because the

issue is here on ap~eal, because the case raises issues of constitu1

tional importance, and because the opinion below is--on several,

'-'
Probable jurisdiction should be noted and the case

material points--questionable, summary action would be
inappropriate.

set for oral argument.
11/23/77
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As we have discussed, this is a very difficult
case.

It is difficult partly because it is unique, and

cannot be fit neatly into either the "taking" framework or
the "police power regulation" framework.

----------------------

It is also

difficult because there are strong interests on both sides
of the question.

On the one hand is the constitutionally

protected value of private property; on the other hand is
the country's interest, perceived by the federal
government, all the states, and many localities, in
preserving our national heritage.

Once destroyed, it could

2.

not be regained.

Because it is highly unlikely that cities

and states will have the resources to pay just compensation
if a landmark designation (with its attendant restrictions
on use and alteration of the property) is considered a
taking, this case could determine the future of landmarks
preservation in this country.

In addition, it could have

collateral effects on environmental regulation and various
other forms of land use regulation.
I have read just about all the main cases cited by
the parties and have looked at some of the law review

.... --

material.

What emerges is general confusion and a

recognition by both the courts and the commentators that
there is no simple test for determining whether a
particular governmental action is a taking or not.

I will

mention some of the tests briefly but will not try to
determine whether any one of them should be dispositive.
One thing should be remembered in analyzing the
issue in this case.

While I stated above that this case

pits the value of private property against the value of
historic preservation, that really is an oversimplification.
~

....

Even if the New York City landmarks law is ·

,nM\

considered regualation, rather than a taking, it still must
be evaluated under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

That is, a holding that this is not a taking

which requires the payment of just compensation is just one
step. Then the property owner still would be able to argue
•
that the regulation is so onerous as to amount to a

3•
deprivation of his property without due process of law.
Because that additional safeguard exists even if the law is
not held to be a taking, the value of private property
still has protection.

I.

Is this a "taking" or a form of regulation?
This is the ~ritical question in the case.
~.-.

T~

It is

critical because when the government "takes" property for

1

public use, it must pay the private owner "just
compensation".

If the landmarks law is classified as

regulation, on the other hand, the regulation need only be
reasonable and must not amount to a deprivation of property
"without due process of law".

In the latter case, if the

property affected by regulation is left with some
reasonable use, there has not been a deprivation of
property without due process; and no compensation need be
paid.
Unfortunately, some of the briefs start from the
premise that this is a taking or that it is regulation,
depending on which side the brief is arguing, and do not
explain how we are supposed to know whether something is a
taking or a form of regulation.

This difficulty is

understandable because the courts have had difficulty over
the years determining whether a particular law effected a
taking or not.
This Court has said that when regulation passes
certain line, it becomes a taking.

Pennsylvania Coal Co.

4.

v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)

(Holmes, J.).

in determing where that line is.

The problem is

There are certain

instances in which it is clear that there has been a
taking.

The clearest example is when the government

actually appropriates private property for its own use,
~ - , to build a highway, a government post office, or an
airport.

This clearly is a taking because the government

proceeds by eminent domain and there is a transfer of title
from the private property owner to the government.

/~~t..t,..~

Penn Central argues that the effect on their

property in this case i1s the same as if the government had ~
taken title to the air rights over Grand Central Terminal,
and therefore it is a taking.
persuasive.

I do not find this argument

,,134-

Under the landmarks law, New York City (the

City) cannot do anything with the air rights over

~

.~f ap9 cl•e.,,v~ l1!(1!,
1~1,I~~

Central any more than Penn Central can.

Aside from the _ ,

fact that there has been no formal transfer of title, the

:e.

•

A_;:/;,r

L,:1/-""'-1

~<t•'c.:• <.. -w.o

City does not possess the incidents of ownership of the a ~ - ~
rights.

For example, it cannot build an office building

over the Terminal.

The most the City can do (and what it

---------

has done) is to prohibit certain uses of the air rights.
This is typically what happens when the government
regulates.

.:B~~

Another form of taking occurs when the governmen ~
does not acquire the title to private property but
physically invades the property.
easement.

~ 6.-

".l-J~~-~ ~ ... ,1._/.
~~- --uI 0

- -71---,~~-

This amounts to taking an ~ ~ .

The easement need not be a permanent invasion of €:~

1·

A - - ~ ...

the property, as would occur if the government put a road

J

"--

~

5.

through one's land.

It also occurs when the government's

darn causes flooding on the private property owner's
.,
=-----~ ...,
,
property and makes it unusable. United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 {1917).

l/JtA/

It happens even when the government

invades the air rights over property by means of low-flying
airplanes on their approach to a public airport.

Griggs v.

J-44

fa-l~->

- - - - " ' ' - " ' - - -..J

--<-

Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 {1962): United States v.
Causby, 328 u. S. 256 {1946) •
Penn Central relies heavily on these last two

cases ~
as doe ~

na@
stant case.

~

because they involve air righ~ . :

~

Penn Central relies on the

observation in Causby that a taking occurred there because ~

.

~.(,,c ,~_.(...

"[t]he owner's right to possess and exploit the land--that G'.--c.«z:..-,i
is to say, his beneficial owenrship of it", was limited.
And in Griggs the Court {per Douglas, J.), said that "the
use of land presupposes the use of some of the airspace
above it . . . . Otherwise no home could be built, no tree
planted, no fence constructed, no chimney erected."

Penn

Central attempts to glean from these cases the proposition
that a limitation on the potential development of air
rights component of the property amounts to a taking.
I do not read those cases that way.

----

'
written as physical
intrusion cases where the
ruined the value of the use that originally was being
of the property, the same as if the property had been
flooded or had a highway run through it.

In other words,

the Court looked at the effect on the owner's previous use

6.

of the property (in Causby, as a chicken farm; in Griggs,
as a private residence); the observation that the ownership
of land encompasses the right to the air space over it was
part and parcel of the discussion of the owner's enjoyment
of the land free from physical invasion.

Thus, the Causby

Court said:
"We would not doubt that, if the United States
erected an elevated railway over respondents' land
at the precise altitude where its planes now fly,
there would be a partial taking . . . . The
reason is that there would be an intrusion so
immediate and direct as to subtract from the
owenr's full enjoyment of the property and to
limit his exploitation of it. While the owner
does not in any physical manner occupy that
stratum of airspace or make use of it in the
conventional sense, he does use it in somewhat the
same sense that space left between buildings for
the purpose of light and air is used. The
superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so
close to the land that continuous invasions of it
affect the use of the surface of the land itself.
We think that the landowner, as an incident to his
ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of
it are in the same category as invasions of the
surface."
328 U.S., at 264-65.

Here the City has not invaded the

airspace over the Grand Central Terminal at all.
..._

---------------------------

The

Griggs and Causby cases therefore do not control.

~~

· ·
of the "'a-,u,ff,i~'7J.-riw:t.....,.,C4/~
h
h ere h as b een no appropr1at1on
Went
~

~

/~
~

~
'.

1~

~

property for the government's use or physical invasion of
h

~

''

Hc.•tl--L

a-'<-

property by the government, several tests have been 4 ~~~
used to_determine
regulation
is _
confiscatory
and /:,, ;£4,..,,.,,.;
J....
_ _ _ _whether
_ _ _....,___
____
-c.,
~

~ :1ore constitutes a

~

~

cr-~on

taking.

~

One test poses the "-""- ~

whether the government is attempting through

r~gu w ion to prevent a harm to the public (in which case
regulation for a public purpose) or to

7•

confer a benefit on society (in which case it would be a
taking for public use).

This is the distinction between

public purpose and public use.

Penn Central quotes the

following formulation from Freund, The Police Power 546-47
(1904):

7~

"[T] he state takes property by eminent domain
IA..-~~
because it is useful to the public, and under the ,--____,
police power because it is harmful . . . . From
LL• « ~
this results the difference between the power of ./-o fa.I c.-,~
eminent domain and the police power, that the
~
---.
former recognizes a right to compensation, while ,.~
the latter on principle does not."

&,v~ •

Obviously, measures to preserve the health and
safety of the community are traditional police power
measures.

~

~i-0

Thus in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887),

law prohibiting the manufacture of liquor was held not to
be a taking because it was a valid exercise of the police
power to preserve the health of the community.

Similarly,

if a certain product were banned and this completely
deprived a piece of property of all its value, it still
would be considered regulation and not a taking.

Finally,

zoning regulations that are considered necessary to the
community's well-being (such as prohibiting noxious uses in
residential neighborhoods) comes under the police power and
is considered non-compensable regulation.
Penn Central argues that landmarks preservation
1

involves the b reation of a public good ~rather than the
prohibition of a harmful use and therefore is not police
power regulation.

This is because the erection of a

SO-story office building in midtown Manhattan cannot be

,r

w

8•

considered dangerous or otherwise injurious to the public
when the regular zoning laws permit it and there are such
buildings all around the Grand Central property.

While

this is a good point, it should not be dispositive.

----------

the distinction between public good and harm to the public
has been criticized because preventing harm and promoting
good really are two sides of the same coin, although I will
concede that there often will be more common agreement
about what constitutes a nuisance than what constitutes a
public benefit.

(Yet it seems to me that preserving our

national heritage is something most people would agree is a
valid and important goal.)

-- -

Second, the distinction has

been eroded over the years as the police power has expanded

,,,

to include r~gulation promoting aesthetic and other values
affecting the "quality of life" in addition to preventing
health hazards, etc.

See, ~..!..9.·, Village of Belle Terre v.

Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).

I think it is too late to say

p~

that regulation in furtherance of the public good is not a ~

valid police power objective.
of our natu~

Especially when the quality

r::-..~

urb;;-environments is a prime concern of ~ •

f-J'-

~

the community at large, government should not be denied the ~ ,

power to regulate and be consigned to exercising eminentd - a - ~ ~
domain.

~

-

Another test is the diminution in value test.

-

This test looks to see whether the value of the property
has been decreased markedly.
has a very strong argument.

Under this test, Penn Central ~ ~
It has been deprived of the

revenue from the proposed office building.

9.

-

(Penn Central .
~

was supposed to get $1 million per year during the
construction of the building and $3 million per year
thereafter.

I think the lease is for 50 years.)

It has

lost all of that value. But I am not persuaded even by
~
this argument. Conceptually, it makes a lot of sense.

-~----------,~

When the decrease in the value of the property is so
apparent, a taking seems to be present.

The flaw, however,

is that all regulation--and particularly zoning
regulation--diminishes the value of the property from what
its value would be if put to its "highest and best use".
The magnitude of the diminution will vary, of
course, but this Court and other courts have upheld extreme
diminutions in value resulting from zoning and other laws.
The ~ oldblatt case, which you mentioned yesterday, involved
a law in the Town of Hempstead prohibiting the carrying on
of the business of excavating for gravel.

The property

owner in that case lost his whole business and almost the
whole value of the land, which already had been excavated
substantially.

Height restrictions on buildings result in

a decrease in value because the property owner cannot get
the income from the highest building it could build without
restrictions.
The governing principle seems to be that
regulation resulting in a diminution in value is not a
taking unless "its effects are so complete as to deprive
the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject

10.
matter."

United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S.

373, 378 (1945).

"[N]ot every governmental act which

ultimately destroys property rights constitutes a
compensable taking of those rights."
States, 364 U.S. 40, 50 (1964).

Armstrong v. United

(This proposition was

stated in the dissenting opinion but the majority and
dissent agreed on the principle but disagreed as to its
application to the particular case.)

The key seems to be

I

whether the property owner still can make use of this
property and can obtain a reasonable return from it.

a.

'
.
. d'ff
A b 19
1
erence b etween t h e ordinary
zoning
case~---'- ti,u~J-uv..,
,

~--~
..t,,,:..,.tJ~.,.;.L

and the landmarks situation is that in the former, several ~
reasonable uses usually will remain for property even when
a particular use has been ruled out by law.

____

\.4., ~

H.t.t.L~
~

In the

landmarks case, the owner of the property is restricted to ~ ¥ ~

___________

..., property.
one use of the

But this is no different from the ~ .

case of a non-conforming use in zoning.

If an area is

zoned residential and I own a gas station in the midst of
it, I have only two options:

I can continue to use the

property as a gas station (as a prior non-conforming use)
or I can turn the property into residential property.
cannot make any other use of it.

I

And here, Penn Central

has used its property as a railroad terminal for the past
65 years (since 1913) and still receives a reasonable

11.

return on it. 1
The final theory_ (or test) for determining whether
.....

~

t..wa-0

a particular governmental action is a form of valid police , ~ -

~

- ---- -

power regulation or a taking is the "proportionality"
test.

Under that test, we look to the burdens and benefits

of the action.

A standard justification for zoning is that

each piece of property affected is both benefitted and
burdened by the zoning.

Along with the diminution of value

point, this is the main point pressed by Penn Central.

It

argues that landmarks legislation, unlike zoning, singles
out certain properties and imposes on them the whole
burden, with none (or very few) of the benefits, of
historic preservation.

This is the basic fairness

argument, which says that an individual or particular
property owner should not be made to pay for a benefit to

-

society or to shoulder an undue burden of a public benefit.

1. In its brief, Penn Central criticizes the
determination of the N.Y. Court of Appeals that the Penn
Central failed to prove that it does not receive a
reasonable return on the Terminal property. Penn Central
takes issue with a variety of the rules adopted by the
Court of Appeals as to valuation, such as the imputation of
the rental value of the space used for railroad operations
and the very novel theory of subtracting the value
contributed by society to the base on which the return is -;>_ . . . . /.
calculated. Although the Court of Appeals' analysis seems ~
to be flawed as a matter of basic property law, this
~
\ qqestiQD is not before this Court. In a very stupTd
strategic move, ~enn Central did not appeal the Court of ~ Appeals' computation of reasonable return, and that
~.M
question therefore is not before this Court. See Brief for
-,
Appellants 8 n. 7. For purposes of this decision, we must ~
acce t the determination of the Court of A eals that Penn
C ntra
c ve a reasona le return on the Gran
( Central property from its use as a ra1 road terminal.

J.

12.
What the just compensation clause prevents against is the
"capacity of some collective actions to imply that someone
may be subjected to immediately disadvantageous or painful
treatment for no other apparent reason, and in accordance
with no othr apparent principle than that someone else's
claim to satisfaction has been ranked as intrinsically
superior to his own."
Fairness:

Michelman, Property, Utility, and

Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just

Compensation" Law," 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1186 (1967),
quoted in Brief for Appellants 29-30 n. 25.
reasons:

Penn Central

"Here, preserving the cultural significance of

Grand Central was deemed by the Landmarks Commission to be
'intrinsically superior' to the Penn Central's desire to
utilize its air rights.

In such circumstances, designating

Grand Central as a landmark constitutes a taking."

Id.

I would not deny that Penn Central has a strong

-- -

fairness argument.

-------.~

But it seems to me that the argument

proves too much, because it really does cast doubt (and
perhaps threaten)

~ zoning law.

~ t.,;i/-

r

First, Penn Central's assumption (or at least the
way it attempts to portray the situation) is that it has
been "singled out" for detrimental treatment.

Penn Central

buttresses this description with its analogy to "spot
zoning".

But spot zoning is arbitrary, whereas the

landmarks law is not.

The landmarks law is a comprehensive

plan affecting all of New York City and under which

~~~~~
~~...-c~

.,~"'IA,,,..__, ~ ~

?

13.

hundreds of buildings have been designated as
2
landmarks.
Penn Central makes a big mistake when it

&..~

concedes that historic district legislation, such as that

~~

denied, 426 U.S. 905), is valid because, like zoning, it

.&u,. '-"-' "1L.

~
in New Orleans to preserve the French Quarter (see Maher v ~
City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (CA 5 1976), cert.
~

places the burdens and the benefits on the affected
property.

I do not think it should make a difference, as a

constitutional matter, whether all the landmarks are
contiguous or are spread -out all around the City.

-

~~-------=;.._-------

inquiry is whether the plan is rational.

The key

With traditional

zoning, it would be irrational not to treat all the
property in a given area similarly, because that is the
whole point of zoning for different uses.

With landmarks

preservation, however, the rational criterion is whether
the property has aesthetic, historic, or cultural value and
therefore ought to be preserved.

As long as there are

objective criteria for landmarks designation, the plan is
as rational and comprehensive as the traditional zoning
plan or the historic district legislation.

And the effect

on the individual property owner within the zoned area or

2. Of course, as Penn Central notes, many of these
buildings already are owned by the public. But I am sure
that many of them are privately owned. If you are
interested, I will try to obtain the list of New York City
landmarks. But I think we can assume that as a general
matter landmarks legislation will affect both public and
private property .
•

A/~

14.

the historic district, in terms of being restricted in the
use of its property, is the same as the effect on Penn
Central as the owner of a single, free-standing landmark.
Penn Central says the effect is not the same, in
terms of this proportionality of burdens and benefits
theory, because it does not receive the benefit. But this
is not true. 3 I agree that the proportionality is not
as apparent as in the case of zoning, but the value of the
Penn Central property is enhanced by being located in New
York City, which, among other things, has a substantial
tourist industry which doubtless would be diminshed if the
City contained nothing but glass office buildings.

People

come to New York partly because of its historic and
cultural attractions.

--

Thus although the benefit is quite

intangible, it nonetheless is there.
.,,,...

In addition, Penn

Central is in a very bad position to complain that it does
not receive the benefits of the landmarks law.

This is not

a principle of general applicability, and it might not be
that significant, but it is undeniable that Penn Central
owns a lot of hotel property in the Grand Central
n:..ighborh~ d.

These hotels depend not only on the business

trade but also on the tourist trade.

{This point is not

3. In addition, it too proves too much. The owner of
property on the border of two zones,~-, residential and
commercial, is burdened as much as the owner in the midst
of the residential district but does not benefit as much.
He is surrounded on one side by commercial property but
cAnnot put his own property to the more lucrative
commercial use.

15.

defeated by the fact that Penn Central is selling some of
_ · the purchase

its hotel property;

price undoubtedly comprises the value of being located in
midtown Manhattan where tourists visit.)

Thus whatever

might be the case of the owner of a single piece of
property, Penn Central really cannot argue that it does not
benefit from the landmarks law.
A final word on this proportionality pro~ lem:

------~-----------

the

Goldblatt case involved a general safety law, couched in
general terms, prohibiting excavation.

But in fact the

burden of the ordinance would fall only on a few property
owners whose property was located near the shore of the
Long Island Sound because, Ruth informs me, gravel pits
exist only near water.

Thus the ordinance in Goldblatt

could have been viewed as a taking as much as the New
City landmarks law, if Penn Central's theory were to
prevail.
In sum, although the question is far from easy and
the line is hard to draw, I would view the landmarks
legislation as valid police power regulation that is not
confiscatory and therefore is not a taking.

I'll add just

three final observatons on this point.
(1)

Penn Central's brief attempts to convince the

Court that it would be departing from precedent and fouling
up property law by affirming the New York Court of
Appeals.

I disagree.

While the court's opinion is

terrible and adopts certain novel and probably erroneous

16.

theories, this Court does not have to affirm its
reasoning.

We are concerned with what is correct reasoning

and with the correctness of the judgment below.

(This

Court can express its disagreement with the reasoning of
the court below in the opinion, especially about the
observation that the landmarks law is not a zoning law.
Perhaps it technically is not a zoning law, but the zoning
analogy seems more accurate than any other.)
=--~

....

--

....

According to

my reading of the cases, this Court has tried over the
years not to interfere with local and state legislation
dealing with land use.

As new forms of regulation have

cropped up in response to new problems, created by the
increasing closeness and complexity of society (especially
problems dealing with cities, growth, and the environment)
the courts have been willing to allow them as long as there
remained so~

use _of, and reasonable return on, the

-

If the Court holds that this is a taking, I

property .

.

(2)

think it will call into question various zoning laws and
new laws directed at preserving the natural environment.
For example, I've attached a clipping about a town
ordinance prohibiting property owners from cutting down
trees over a certain age without permission.

Although this

kind of law obviously will not cause diminutions of
property such as the one at issue in this case, it is an
example of zoning that does not apply to contiguous
•
property but "singles out" property according to certain

·1

17.
objective characteristics.
landmarks law.
similar:

This is exactly like the

The example I mentioned to you yesterday is

Assume that New York City decided that it had to

deal effectively with a glut of office space and a dearth
of residential housing and recreational facilities.

It

therefore enacted an ordinance absolutely prohibiting any
more office building development.

Again, the law would not

apply within a certain geographic area and would affect
some property owners (those owning land they want to
develop as office buildings), but not others (those owning
existent office buildings), throughout the city.

Yet I

think this would be upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power.

Similar reasoning would apply to lands

affected with some special environmental interest.
(3)

All that is involved in this case is the

landmark's commission's denial of Penn Central's
application to build a 50-story glass tower on top of Grand
Central Station.

We do not know how the commission would

rule if Penn Central were to present an architectural
design resembling the original plans for an office building
atop the Terminal.

See Brief for Appellants 3-4; App. 90

(showing a picture of the original plan for Grand Central,
which including a building above it).

I am not saying that

the commission would approve such a plan; but the fact that
it is conceivable that Penn Central could obtain approval
to build a more appropriate structure above the
Terminalmakes it harder to say that Penn Central's property
actually has been taken.

18.

II.

The significance of th@ _ 7

This memo has gotten a bit long, so I will not
give you the extended discussion of the TDR's that I had
planned.

I will make two points, one explanatory and one

theoretical.
In our conversation yesterday I mentioned a little
bit about how the TDR's operate, in general and under the
particular New York City scheme.

Rather than go into that

in greater detail here, I'll refer you to appellants' brief
at 38-42 for a discussion of their basic operation.
Everyone, including the New York court, seems to agree that
the New York City TDR plan has significant defects.

These

are, primarily, their speculative nature, the fact that the
risk of disposing of them is placed on the property owner
rather than the government, the restrictions placed on
them, and the administrative burden of obtaining TDR's.
Some of the restrictiveness of use of the TDR's is
eliminated under the Chicago plan, see Brief for Appellants
40 n. 33; and the problems of speculativeness and burden of
disposal could be solved by the creation of a transferable
development rights bank, see id. 42 n. 34.

These are

legislative matters, however, where experimentation is
necessary.
I agree with appellants that at least the New York
City TDR's would be insufficient to amount to "just
compensation" if in fact there has been a taking.

The main

19.

proponent of TDR's (Professor Costonis) has stated that
TDR's are not "just" compensation but only "fair"
.

compensation.

4

But even if the Court holds that the

4. Costonis has his own new theory for land use, which
he calls "the accommodation power", which is a midway
position between eminent domain and the police power.
Because his theory is formulated out of whole cloth, he
also invents this new standard of compensation. I did not
think the Court would be interested in adopting an approach
that is this unprecedented.
landmarks law is valid regulation and does not amount to a
taking, I think the TDR's should play a role.

In other

words, I would be troubled by a holding that said the
landmarks laws are valid even without the TDR's.

7

Because

'

the TDR's provide some benefit to the landowner, it would
be bad for the Court to give the states an incentive to
remove the TDR's from their landmarks laws.

Since we all

recognize that the landowner is being burdened even if the
burden does not amount to a taking, legislatures should be
encouraged to continue to provide for TDR's and to refine
them to be a more valuable and less speculative property
right.
The best way to do this that I have come across is
to consider the TDR's as one indicator that the owner still
obtains a reasonable return from the property and as
evidence that there has not been a taking.

The SG suggests

this approach in his brief at 26 n. 22, where he says:

1t?ink

that the transferable development righs under the

\ city's law are best seen not as 'compensation' for a

"We

.:5 G-

20.
'taking' but as a reasonable measure to ensure that
development rights customarily associated with a parcel of
property are not taken at all."

In other words, in

response to Penn Central's contention that its property
right in developing the air rights has been taken
completely (rather than saying that its use of the whole
parcel has been limited), the SG says the development
rights have not been taken but have been altered or

1

transferred.

In short, as long as there is a reasonable

return on the portion of the property that already has been
developed and some alternative form of development right is
substituted for the air rights, there has been no taking.

N.B.
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77-444 Penn Central
1.

Issue:

Is New York City landmark law a

"taking" or is it "regulation"?
2.

The "air rights" argument:

(a} City does not "take" air rights; no property
interest.
(b}

What about a darn "flooding"?

Low flying

(c}

Griggs and Causby involved low flying

planes?

planes:

destroyed value of the use then being made for the

property.

Here, previous use not impaired.

Nor, any

physical invasion of air space.
3.

A "regulation" may constitute a "taking".

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.
(a}

Question is whether regulation in fact is

confiscatory.
(b}

"Police power" used to protect public from

harm (e.g. zoning - public health and safety}; "regulation"
- if confiscatory - is equivalent to a "taking".

A taking

- eminent domain - creates a public benefit.
(c} Penn Central says a "benefit" is created here;
thus police power not involved.

2.

(d)
eroded.

But police power/benefit theory has been

See Village of Belle Terre "quality of life"

improved by zoning.
4.

"Dimunition in value test".

(a)
value.

Penn Central loses opportunity to enhance

Has its traditional use been diminished?
(b)

Goldblatt - town of Hempstead prohibited

excavation of
...,._. .,e,J"., ;/,,-

5.

gr~ ~

:2:~=::~t~ business,t...:/

-1•C,U. lllt~ V-..,1.., ~)-,•~
•
Zoning benefits or a f fects an area: a

landmarks restriction places entire burden on a single
owner.
/;,.
(a)
zoning.

Proportionality test.
Both benefits and detriments may flow from

Penn Central argues only detriments here.
(b)

Will not landmarks designation and

preservation benefit adjacent Penn Central real estate.
(c)

Is Penn Central earning a reasonable return

on Grand Central?

New York court held that Penn Central

failed to prove it was not earning such a return.
issue still in the case?

Is this
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77-444 Penn Central
Is New York City Jandmark 1aw a

Issue:

1.

"taking" or is it "regulation"?
2.

.

The "air rights" argument:

. '

(a) City does not "take" air rfghts; no property
interest. "
(b)

What about a dam "flooding"?

Low flying

(c)

§rigg_~ and Q~!!2Y involved low flying

planes?

planes:

destroyed value of the use then being made for the

property.

Here, previous use not impaired.

,'

'

Nor, any

physical invasion of air space.

3.

A "regulation" may constitute a "taking".
'·,

PennsyJvania_Co~]_fo. v. Mahon.
(a)

Questjon is whether regulation jn fact is

confiscatory.

~,
.l .

(b)

"Po) icf' power" used to protect pub] ic from

harm (e.g. zoning

public health and ~afety); "regulation"

- if confiscatory - is equivalent to a "taking".

A tak'ng

'•·

- emjnent domain - creates a public benefit.
(c) Penn Central says a "benefit" is created her~1
thus police power not involved.
I

~r

'

'

,.,
'

2.
,.

f

e roded.

(d)

But police power/benefit theory has been

See Villa~of Belle Terre "quality of

i mproved by zoning.
-\"\Yf ..,;Y
Jil?'
-~
... !

;~;i"',

4. ·•' "Dimuni tion in value test".

·-'\_,f'i;

(a)

~- ·i''

Penn CentraJ loses opportunity to enhance

~;~ :~.Jt -~

va lue .

Has its traditional use been diminished?
(b)

Goldblatt - town of Hempstead prohibited

e xcavation of gravel.
5.

,,,

Owner lost existing business.

zoning benefits or affects an areai a

landmarks restriction p]aces entire bur.den on a single
owner .
~ -

fro;eortionali~y_i~st.
4_t'

(a)
zoning.

Both behefits and detriments may fJow

,,,

Penn Central argues only detr.iments here.
(b)

Will
not landmarks designation and ·
.,

preservation benefit adjacent
earning a r easonab 1 e return

(c)

on Grand
failed to prov~ it was not earning such a return.
the case?
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April 19, 1978
,,,f,.

Memo to Fi.le
No. 77-444 Penn Central v. City of New York
,,

,~

• In preparing for the Conference, I have read the
l,

following cases - among others:

~

1.

(j.,

·t.,.

,!

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 u.s. 393

Ji..
.. 1·

a celebrated case in view of the participants:

(1922)

John

w.

Davis ana Henry S. Drinker were counsel for the

Coal Company: the then Attorney General of Pennsylvania

,:J.

(George E. Alter) was out counsel for the state~ the
opinion was by Holmes and the dissent by Brandeis.
The statute prescribed the mining of coal and
other minerals in such a way as to undermine residences,
public streets or buildings.

The Coal Company here held a

.

'
,· ...

valid lease to coal deposits beneath private residences
built by owners of the surface.
"-41

~

The statute was viewed as a regulation pursuant to

the police power (safety).

It provided for no

compensation.
The Court invalidated the statute, holding that it
constituted a "taking".

It recognized, however, the ~

closeness of the issue and the difficulty of enunciating a
general rule:

•

..,.

,,

'l

2.

"The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional
cases, like the blowing of a house to stop a
conflagration, go - and if they go beyond the
general rule, whether they do not stand as much
upon tradition as upon principle. Bowditch v.
Boston, 101 U.S. 16. In general it is not plain
that a man's misfortunes or necessities will
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's
shoulders • .§.Eede v. 1.Y!ln & Boston R.R. Co., 172
Mass. 488, 489. We are in danger of forgetting
that a strong public desite to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire to a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change. As we already have
said, this is a question of degree - and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions."

..

'

''

260 U.S., 415-416.

It is to be noted that the.Court acknowledged that
cases of this kind cannot be disposed of by "general
propositions".'

(1915).

'f

The case was characterized as presenting "a

question of degree" - to be resolved on the facts.

2.

,

.,.,
.''/:\.,;::,

Hadacheck v. Los AngeJes, 239 U.S. 394

Los AngeJes, by ordinance made it unlawful to

operate a brickyard within the city.

Petitioner owned a

tract of land containing "a very valuable bed of clay",
worth "about $800,000 for brickmaking purpose, but not
exceeding $60,000 for residential purposes".

The Court's

sustained the ordinance as a valid exercise of police
power.

It construed the ordinance as identifying

, brickyards as "nuisances in fact and law", and held

,,

3.

that under the policy power the conducting of certain
businesses can be found to be nuisances and confined to
particular localities.

The Court relied upon Reinman v.

Little Roe~, 237 U.S. 171.
The court noted that the ordinance did not
prohibit the mining of removal of the clay, but only the
oper~tion of a brick manufacturing plant.
,.
,.

I do not view the case as being particularly
relevant.

It was not cited in Holmes' opinion in

Pennsylvania Coal Co., although ft was cited by Brandeis in

...

dissent • ..

!,/

•'

..

\.: ~·

3.
(1975).

Maher v. City of N!! Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051

In this case

CAS

sustained a New Orleans ordinance

that regulated the preservation and maintenance of
buildings in the historic Vieux Carre section of the city
(French Quarter).
Maher owned a cottage in the French Quarter;
desired to demoJish it and erect a seven apartment complex
on the site. · He attached the validity of the ordinance as
taking his property without compensation and also as a
denial of due process.
In a rather elaborate opinion, the Court sustained
the ordinance. · It held that a zoning ordinance is not

..
;

-;~,,,~i'
~-,,

'··,.
1::,i

)

'

.,,.

_,.

/

4.

invalid because it denies the "highest and best use" of the
property.

In emphasizing that whether regulation amounts

to a taking or denial of due process, is "a matter to be
detemined under all the circumstances in a specific case":
"To survive attack as a taking, the zoning
regulations must - as a threshold matter - satisfy
the due process requirements that its purpose and
means are reasonable. Even if it comports with
due process, a regulatory ordinance may
nonetheless be a taking if it is unduly onerous so
as to be confiscatory. The Supreme Court has held
that every regulation is in some sense a
prohibition and that whether a given regulation
treads over the line of proper regulation and
operates as a taking of property is a matter to be
determined under all circumstances in a specific
case." 516 F.2d, at 1065.

.
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April 19, 1978
Justice Powell,
This volume contains the Jurisdictional Statement
~

v~
,

'b

I

O and

your ma statement opposing jurisdiction in West Bros.

Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria.

I found it very interesting--

~ I,, I & this case is almost identical to the Hadacheck case I gave
Jt:Ji"31 you yesterday. In both cases, the property owner wanted to

y ~e his

property, containing valuable clay, in a brick-

or tile-making business.

In West Bros. the value of the

investment was $500,000.00.

And, as in Hadacheck, the

property originally had been outside the city limits.

In

West Bros. the Virginia court upheld the exercise of the
police power to promote the general welfare as well as to
get rid of actual threats to health and safety, and while
noting that the regulation might seem arbitrary as applied
to neighboring properties, was generally reasonable.
appellant in West Bros.

The

seems to have based his argument

primarily on the unreasonableness of the~ regulation under
the due process clause, rather than asking for just compenthat there was a
sation as a taking; but he could have argued/taking just as
legitimately as Penn Central has,

~HK for it is clear, as

it was in Hadacheck, that this was a major restriction on the
use to which the property had been put and resulted in a
great loss to the property owner.
As I said yesterday, the cases in which a taking has
been found are exceedingly rare.

MRiaxxxxkH With the exception

2.

of the Pennsylvania Coal case, the Court has denied that
there has been a taking wixk when faced with almost every
kind of land use regulation (limiting building height,
setback requirements, prohibitions of various uses of land-as in these clay/brick cases and the Goldblatt case, and
all the various kinds of zoning ordinances).

My opinim

is that the precedent stands firmly behind a conclusion
that there was no taking in the Penn Central case.
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Memo to File
No. 77-444 Penn Central v. City of New York
In preparing for the Conference, I have read the
following cases - among others:
1.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393

(1922) - a celebrated case in view of the participants:
John W. Davis and Henry S. Drinker were counsel for the
Coal Company; the then Attorney General of Pennsylvania
(George E. Alter) was out counsel for the state; the
opinion was by Holmes and the dissent by Brandeis.
The statute prescribed the mining of coal and
other minerals in such a way as to undermine residences,
public streets or buildings.

The Coal Company here held a

valid lease to coal deposits beneath private residences
built by owners of the surface.
The statute was viewed as a regulation pursuant to
the police power (safety).

It provided for no

compensation.
The Court invalidated the statute, holding that it
constituted a "taking".

It recognized, however, the

closeness of the issue and the difficulty of enunciating a
general rule:

2.

"The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. It may be doubted how far exceptional
cases, like the blowing of a house to stop a
conflagration, go - and if they go beyond the
general rule, whether they do not stand as much
upon tradition as upon principle. Bowditch v.
Boston, 101 U.S. 16. In general it is not plain
that a man's misfortunes or necessities will
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor's
shoulders. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 172
Mass. 488, 489. We are in danger of forgetting
that a strong public desite to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire to a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change. As we already have
said, this is a ~estion of degree - and therefore
cannot be dis:gose oi: i5y general propositions."
260 u .'"s., trs aTB. - It is to be noted that the Court acknowledged that
cases of this kind cannot be disposed of by "general
propositions".

The case was characterized as presenting "a

question of degree" - to be resolved on the facts.

2.
(1915).

Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394

Los Angeles, by ordinance made it unlawful to

operate a brickyard within the city.

Petitioner owned a

tract of land containing "a very valuable bed of clay",

I

worth "about $800,000 for brickmaking purpose, but not
exceeding $60,000 for residential purposes".

The Court's

sustained the ordinance as a valid exercise of police
power.

It construed the ordinance as identifying

brickyards as "nuisances in fact and law", and held

3.

that under the policy power the conducting of certain
businesses can be found to be nuisances and confined to
particular localities.

The Court relied upon Reinman v.

Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171.
The Court noted that the ordinance did not
prohibit the mining of removal of the clay, but only the
operation of a brick manufacturing plant.
I do not view the case as being particularly
relevant.

It was not cited in Holmes' opinion in

Pennsylvania Coal Co., although it was cited by Brandeis in
dissent.

3.
(1975).

Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051

In this case CA5 sustained a New Orleans ordinance

that regulated the preservation and maintenance of
buildings in the historic _vieux Carre section of the city
(French Quarter).
Maher owned a cottage in the French Quarter;
desired to demolish it and erect a seven apartment complex
on the site.

He attached the validity of the ordinance as

taking his property without compensation and also as a
denial of due process.
In a rather elaborate opinion, the Court sustained
the ordinance.

It held that a zoning ordinance is not

'

.

4.

invalid because it denies the "highest and best use" of the
property.

In emphasizing that whether regulation amounts

to a taking or denial of due process, is "a matter to be
detemined under all the circumstances in a specific case":
"To survive attack as a taking, the zoning
regulations must - as a threshold matter - satisfy
the due process requirements that its purpose and
means are reasonable. Even if it comports with
due process, a regulatory ordinance may
nonetheless be a taking if it is unduly onerous so
as to be confiscatory. The Supreme Court has held
that every regulation is in some sense a
prohibition and that whether a given regulation
treads over the line of proper reg·ulation and
operates as a taking of property is a matter to be
determined under all circumstances in a specific
case." 516 F.2d, at 1065.

I

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMBERS OF

June 2, 1978

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

2.llffe)l.~

77-444 - Penn Central Transportation Co., v. City of NY

Dear Bill,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

,

..

.

...,.,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

-

;§u.prtttU {!Jourl of tqt ~ b ;§taftg

~ru;lpttghtn. ,. QJ. 20ffe~,
CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 5, 1978

Dear Bill:
Re:

Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Yorl

I join _your dissent.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

inttrtmt <!}cu.rt cf tlrt ~ttitt~ j;ta:tts
'Dhtsftingfon. JD. <!}. 2llgil1;4
CHAMl!IERS Or'

June S, 1978

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 77-444 -

Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
City of New York

Dear Bill:

Please join rre.
Sincerely,

?M
. .

T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc;

The Conference

,.

~nprtutt QJ.ttnrl of tfrt ~~ ~bdtg

'Jllru1fyhtgi~ J. QJ. 2llffe'!-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 6, 1978
,.,

77-444, Penn Central v. New York
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion
for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

-.
Mr. Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference

'·.

'

f

,-

June 14, 1978

No. 77-444 Penn Central v. New York

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 15, 1978

Re:

No. 77 -444

-

Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York

Dear Bill:
Please join me.

'•

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan

cc:

The Conference

ro:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:
RE:

Nancy

June 15, 1978

Penn Central

I spoke to Dave Carpenter about the final footnote
in this opinion, and he said he would see if his boss would
be willing to leave it in in its present state.

That would

require some negotiation with BRW, however, (or at least his
clerk), so the final content of the footnote is up in the air.
I told Dave, though, that you felt strongly that counsel's
concession should be included.

~u:prmu QJ01trl o-f flr~ ~ l t ~bdt•

';Jll'N#Jrm:ghnt. ~. QJ. 2llffe~,
CHAMBERS

or

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

✓
June 16, 1978

Re:

77-444 - Penn Central v. New York

·:

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
Respectfully,

JL
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

17 - iV&(
June 22, 1978
Justice Powell,
I've asked Dave Carpenter, and he has agreed, to make
the changes indicated on the attached revision of Penn Central.
I was afraid that the language used by WJB might be construed
to mean that land use controls, including historic preservation,
are constitutional as long as they are "reasonably related to
the implementation of a policy • • • expected to produce a
widespread public benefit", without more,even though the rest
of the opinion discusses various other requirements for
iaRBXHKH

historic preservation laws to be constitutional.

I think the change helps somewhat.

I had thought that this

note was going to be changed only to reflect the idea that
what is a "noxious use" is an amorphous concept; this idea is
stated in the second paragraph
is is presently

If you have any proble
written, I'll convey it
version, as amended, to

He is sending the present
today.

C!Jcu:rt cf flrt 'Jfutit.ch jtaf.t.G
~rurlp:ngfon, ~- C!J. 211ffe)l.~

~ttpttutt

CHAMeERS Of"

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: 77-444--Penn Central v. New York City
In addition to the changes marked in the draft circulated
today, June 21st, I plan, absent dissent, to make the following
additional changes:

(1) Add the following language to footnote 27:
Similarly, Welch, Goldblatt, and Gorieb illustrate the
fallacy of appellants' related contention that a "taking"
must be found to have occurred whenever the land use
restriction may be characterized as imposing a "servi~ude"
on the claimant's parcel.

~Lo~

(2) Rewrite footnote 30 to read as follo

~ ...

_

Appellants attempt to distinguish
cases on the ground
that, in each, Government was proh biting a "noxious" use
of land and that in the present c se, in contrast,
appellants' proposed construction above the Terminal would
be beneficial. We observe that th uses in issue in
Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt w re perfectly lawful in
themselves. They involved no "bla eworthiness, . . • moral
wrongdoing, or conscious act of da gerous risk-taking which
induce[d society] to shift the cos to a particular
individual." Sax, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 50 (1964). These cases
are better understood as resting n ton any supposed
"noxious" quality of the prohibite uses but rather on the
())ere. L__._jg~r~o~u!n~d9-__!t~h~a~tL~~~~~~~~~~~~f!~zrryp-<JS1ITT'i-;,,;wry1~"fO"rrt~~~c:)
compensation, whe~the restrictio s
reasonably relatep
to the implementation of a policy -like historic
~
UAipreservation--that~be exp~ctea ) :2 p ; oduce a ~wide_j£~ ea ~ 1
public benefit ~
~
~oJ-0~~
Nor, corr~l atively, can it be asserte d that f he
·
destr tion or fundamental alteration of a historic
landmark is "beneficial." The suggestion that the
beneficial quality of appellant's proposed construction is
established by the fact the construction would have been
consistent with appplicable zoning laws ignores the
development in sensibilities and ideals reflected in
landmark legislation like New York City's. Cf. West
,Brother Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 282-283,
a eal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
ques 10n,
WJB, Jr.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: 77-444--Penn Central v. New York City
In addition to the changes marked in the draft circulated
today, June 21st, I plan, absent dissent, to make the following
additional changes:
(1) Add the following language to footnote 27:
Similarly, Welch, Goldblatt, and Gorieb illustrate the
fallacy of appellants ' related contention that a "taking"
must be found to have occurred whenever the land use
restriction may be characterized as imposing a "servitude"
on the claimant's parcel.
'
(2) Rewrite footnote 30 to read as follows:
30. Appellants attempt to distinguish these cases on the
ground that, in each, Government was prohibiting a
"noxious" use of land and that in the present case, in
contrast, appellants' proposed construction above the
Terminal would be beneficial. We observe that the uses in
issue in Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt were perfectly
lawful in themselves.
They involved no "blameworthiness,
• . . moral wrongdoing, or conscious act of dangerou~
risk-taking which induce[d society] to shift the cost to a
particular individual." Sax, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 50 (1964).
These cases are better understood as resting not on any
supposed "noxious" quality of the prohibited uses but
rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably
related to the implementation of a policy--not unlike
historic preservation--expected to produce a widespread
public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated
property.
Nor, correlatively, can it be asserted that the
destruction or fundamental alteration of a historic
landmark is not harmful.
The suggestion that the
beneficial quality of appellant's proposed construction is
established by the fact the construction would have been
consistent with appplicable zoning laws ignores the
development in sensibilities and ideals reflected in
landmark legislation like New York City's. Cf. West
Brother Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 282-283,
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question, 302 U.S. 658 (1937).
WJB, Jr.
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